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1. Introduction
Income inequality has been a perennial topic of economic and social interest, but never
more so than the present, where dramatic changes have followed within just a short
span of time. Performance driven management rewards seen as excessive have attracted
much public attention. But other influences have been at least as pervasive. Technologi-
cal displacement for middle management, import competition from cheaper emerging
countries, free trade agreements, adverse fallouts from public spending bubbles, com-
modity price reversals, the global financial crisis, are all some of the causal influences,
combining as the perfect storm in their fallouts for remuneration and employment down
the line. The empirical content of the present paper, namely the ten years in Europe just
prior to and succeeding the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), reflect changes of this sort.
To what extent they represent welfare loss, and how to measure it, requires a metho-
dology that is itself adapted to the economic and social context. Metrics are one thing;
meaningful metrics in this context are quite another. The agenda of the present paper is
to develop and apply such metrics to the experience of the dramatic, if not tumultuous,
years between 2005 - 2013 in European countries.
In the most general sense, metrics for income distributions are part of a wider body
of knowledge into social welfare functions developed and debated over many years.
But establishing a consensus has not been easy. At the most abstract level, Goodman &
Arrow (1953) showed that the possibility of a consistent ordinal social utility as earlier
envisaged by Bergson (1938) and Samuelson (1947), was limited at best and certainly
would not extend to universal agreement among the subjects themselves as to a single
best metric for income inequality. The empirics have therefore focused upon metrics for
income inequality that appeal in designated ways to the observer’s own preconceptions
as to fairness. Still the best known and most widely accepted metric of this kind is the
Gini coefficient, which measures the non-alignment of the accumulated percentage of
income with the progressive numbers of the people enjoying it. As the Gini coefficient
is not able to represent different social preferences Atkinson (1970), Donaldson & Wey-
mark (1980) and Yitzhaki (1983) propose a parametric extension, where the parameter
can account for different preferences (Greselin & Zitikis, 2015). Sen (1970) proposed a
metric that combines in itself both the mean income and the complement (1-G) of the
Gini index.
But the Gini has several downsides. One of the most obvious problems is the ambiguity
of the coefficient itself. Since it reflects the integral of the difference of the 45◦ line and
the Lorenz curve, we can mirror the Lorenz curve on the orthogonal line that intersects
the 45◦ line in the middle, and end up with just the same Gini. Apart from this, there
is a potential ambiguity problem arising in intertemporal or cross country comparisons.
Davies & Hoy (1995) point out that where two Lorenz curves intersect it may not be
possible to rank the Gini coefficients, even using the same underlying social welfare
function; only with further assumptions about the variance, this is possible. The problem
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is a general one and applies to all measures based on the Lorenz curves.
As a possible alternative, the Theil index (Theil, 1965) uses the distribution’s Shannon
entropy in order to measure the expected information content of the distribution, which
is then interpreted as inequality. But as Sen (1970) puts it, "... the average of the loga-
rithms of the reciprocals of income shares weighted by incomes shares [the Theil index]
is not a measure that is exactly overflowing with intuitive sense"(Sen, 1970, p. 36). See
also Conceição & Ferreira (2000). On the other hand, the Theil index does obey the axi-
om of decomposability (Foster, 1983; Kraemer, 1998), which means that the measure
for the whole distribution can be expressed as a weighted sum of the measure applied
to subgroups. Bourguignon (1979) showed that the Gini coefficient, together with other
proposed metrics, does not have this property.
But a more contextual problem with the Gini index is that it lacks direction as to the
source of the inequality. Specifically, it does not properly pick up the kind of inequality
that would concern most observers, namely positive distribution skewness, meaning too
many people on low incomes. Following the precept of Dalton (1920) that any measure-
ment of inequality has implicitly a social welfare reference, Atkinson (1970) also Foster
et al. (1984), address the direction problem by means of an observer chosen parameter
that reflects a greater, or lesser, observer preoccupation with the positive skewness in the
income distribution. Formally, the Atkinson index can be transformed to the Theil index
and thus both indices belong to the class of the generalized entropy measures, which is a
single parameter family (Jenkins & Van Kerm, 2009). In turn, there exist generalizations
from the single parameter family to a two parameter family (Foster & Shneyerov, 1999).
However, a quite different tack to the directional problem has been taken in recent
contribution by Bowden (2016a). His v-index (standing for disadvantage or envy) looks
at inequality from the point of view of the subjects themselves; an internal rather than
external vantage point. On the average, do people think that others are better off, or
worse off, than themselves? The resulting metric can be simply expressed in terms of
the means of ancillary distributions, the left and right unit entropic shifts of the original.
As a welfare oriented asymmetry metric, the v-metric will be employed as a point of
departure in the present paper.
A more complete approach of this kind would also have to pay attention to two further
welfare aspects. One is the dispersion of the income distribution, as a ’noticeability’
property. Wide dispersion attracts more attention to very high or very low incomes, in
this context relative to my own. A second is the average income itself. If times are good,
higher incomes in others attract less opprobrium. There is a correspondence here with
managerial remuneration practices; if the firm is doing well, and stockholder rewards
are good, then a hike in executive remuneration is carried, even with acclaim, at the
company AGM.
All this suggests that three key metrics are involved in social judgements about income
distribution: the mean (or median), the skewness, and the dispersion (spread). All are
tacitly embodied in Sen’s welfare metric, for the Gini index itself can be shown to depend
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on both the asymmetry and the spread (Bowden, 2016a). The problem is that the Gini
index does not separate out the two, or more precisely, the direction of the asymmetry.
A cardinal utility analysis would call on some optimum weighting of the three welfare
dimensions: mean, asymmetry, and dispersion. But in an ordinal framework, one can
adopt an indifference curve approach, to some degree reminiscent of the ordinal utility
Bergson-Samuelson framework for a social welfare function. This might not be so useful
for direct inter-country comparisons as such. But by longitudinal comparisons over time
in the three key metrics, one can compare experiences between countries, as a matter of
comparative welfare economics.
Comparisons of this kind are facilitated if the metrics for asymmetry and spread fall
within a common framework. The present contribution provides such a basis in terms
of metric duality, which in this context means that the two metrics can be obtained
by a simple internal change of sign. This ensures both dimensional conformity and a
convenient phase plane diagram over time.
The empirical application utilises such a framework to study changes that took place
pre- and post- the Global Financial Crisis in Europe. This is not to say that the GFC and
its aftermath were by any means the sole causal influence. These were also the times
of structural change arising from import competition, the oil price rise and (incipient)
fall, and other contributing factors. The result was some dramatic changes in income
distribution metrics and implicitly, the rise or fall in their latent social indifference le-
vel surfaces (section 2.3). Nor were these changes equally severe across the respective
countries. The empirical work of the present paper translates the experiences of 15 of
the major European countries in the form of dynamic phase planes between directed
asymmetry and spread. It turns out that there are marked differences, which can be
categorised into two groups, the risers (‘bad’) and the fallers (‘good’). These tend to be
uncompensated by relative difference in their respective mean income series.
The scheme of the paper is as follows. Section 2 is a methodological review, establishing
the dual asymmetry and spread metrics, followed by a short discussion of their use as
joint proxies for social welfare. Section 3 is the empirical core of the paper. Spread and
asymmetry phase planes are graphed for fifteen major European countries between 2005
and 2013. Accompanying tables and discussion highlight similarities and differences
in their respective experiences over this interval. Section 4 contains some concluding
remarks.
2. Methodological review
In what follows the conceptual basis is reviewed, starting with the metrics for disad-
vantage as directed asymmetry, together with spread. Mathematical details are kept to
a minimum; a more comprehensive treatment can be found in Bowden (2012, 2016a,b),
also Kraemer (2016) for the axiomatic basis as an income inequality metric. Section 2.3
turns to consideration of the social welfare; the asymmetry and spread metrics for any
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given year can be viewed as analogous to points on a social welfare indifference cur-
ve. Over successive years this curve may itself change, with social welfare shifts as an
outcome.
2.1. The asymmetry metric
Let y be the income random variable, defined on R+ with distribution function F(y)
and density f (y). Suppose my own income is y. The metric for asymmetry derives
from comparisons between incomes above mine and those below. The average of those
below is the lower conditional expectation µl(y) = E [Y|Y ≤ y] and for those above,
µr(y) = E [Y|Y > y]. Relative to those above and below, my net disadvantage is
v(y) = (µr(y)− y)− (y− µl(y)) . (1)
Taking the expected value over the entire distribution F(y) gives a scalar metric that
represents the average degree of peer relative advantage:
v = E (v(y)) = µL + µR − 2µ. (2)
Here µ is the mean of the original or natural income distribution. The two terms µL, µR
also refer to means, but in this case of ancillary distributions with densities defined by
fL(y) = ξL(y) f (y); fR(y) = ξR(y) f (y), (3)
where ξL(y) = − ln F(y); ξR(y) = − ln (1− F(y)) are factors (technically, Radon-
Nikodym derivatives) that shift the original distribution respectively to the left and
right. The corresponding distribution functions are given by
FL(y) = F(y) (1+ ξL(y)) ; 1− FR(y) = (1− F(y)) (1+ ξL(y)) (4)
In such terms, the metric 2 becomes easy to compute, starting with the original hi-
stogram for the income distribution. Expression 2 can be more compactly expressed
as v = 2 (µc − µ) , where µc is the mean of the centred or average shift Fc(y) =
(FL(y) + FR(y)) /2 . Noting that µ, µl , µr are all commensurate first moments, the stan-
dardisation v˜ = v/µ is recommended for time series or cross section applications.
The resulting metric v is explicitly a directional asymmetry metric. A value v > 0 means
that the distribution is positively skewed, so that µ > xm , the median, while if v < 0
the reverse is true: µ < xm. Unlike textbook skewness diagnostics such as the third
order moment, the v-metric has contextual reference, in this case to how people feel
about their comparative income. Additionally, since the existence of higher moments in
income distributions cannot be granted in general (Kleiber, 1997), it is possible to assess
skewness for a more extended set of distributions.
Figure 1 illustrates with the Norwegian monthly disposable income data (truncated
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at 200,000 NOK). Over the time span 2005 - 2013 the distributions have become more
symmetric, manifested by the corresponding v metrics, though still with some way to
go towards perfect symmetry (v = 0). It should further be noted that the mean has
increased over the years. The standardised values v˜ are respectively 0.72, 0.17 and 0.11
(cf. table 3).
Fig. 1: Norway: monthly disposable income (1 NOK 0.12 USD).
2.2. The dual dispersion metric
A metric for dispersion or distribution spread that is dual with respect to the v-metric
is derived by simply changing the separating sign in expression 1. Thus the function
(µr(y)− y) + (y− µl(y)) (5)
can be interpreted as a dispersion penalty function. This is a two sided function rising
away from the median in either direction. Its expected value is given by
d = (E) (d(y)) = µR − µL. (6)
Note that d > 0 and by construction, d > v. In turn, this can be standardised as d˜ =
d/µ. Several rationales exist for the interpretation of d as a spread or dispersion metric.
It is equal to the total area under the partition entropy function, which refers to the
distribution of uncertainty as to whether Y ≤ y or Y > y as y varies along its range.
Bowden (2012, 2016b) contains further details as to this link. A related rationale runs in
terms of the accumulation function of stochastic dominance theory. A distribution for
which F(y) slopes more gradually will always have a higher value for the metric d.
For the Norwegian example as in figure 1, the d measure has decreased over the given
horizon. The effect is accentuated in the standardised versions d˜, where the values are
1.47, 0.86 and 0.79 (cf. table 3). So the net effect, taken in conjunction with d˜, is for a
narrowing of the distribution spread together with diminishing asymmetry.
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2.3. Level surfaces
The three metrics, namely v for asymmetry and d for spread, together with µ (or the
median) for central tendency, provide cues for thinking how the average person might
react to the publication of income data or an income distribution histogram. A positive
skewness indicator v will indicate that the average person is net disadvantaged relative
to those below and above him or her on the scale. This will be more noticeable where
the distribution has a wider spread. And in both cases the reaction will be moderated
when the average worker’s income has itself risen.
The foregoing suggests an ordinal social welfare function, geared to the average worker,
of the general form
SW = Ψ (µ, v, d) , (7)
with ϕ1 = ∂Ψ∂µ > 0; ϕ2 =
∂Ψ
∂v ≶ 0; ϕ3 = ∂Ψ∂d < 0 . As a further aid to interpretation,
suppose that ϕ is separable between µ and v, d so:
SW = Ψ
(
µ, ϕ
(
v˜, d˜
))
. (8)
This would certainly be the case if the parent function 7 was homogenous in its three
arguments, but it is not necessary to introduce such a restriction.
As it stands, the form 8 could be interpreted as saying that the average worker looks
first at the spread and asymmetry in relation to his or her own income, then modifies
any reaction if the personal income is higher or lower during any given year. For any
given income there is therefore a set of indifference curves (level surfaces) as between
spread and skewness. However, these may not be uniformly concave or convex. For as
skewness (v) becomes more positive, it requires progressively lower dispersion (d) to
materially lessen the envy. By way of contrast, if v becomes more negative, it might
require a progressively higher spread to preserve the same social utility. So the social
indifference curves relating skewness to spread might therefore be sigmoid in shape.
3. The European experience: temporal phase plane
During the years 2005 - 2013 Europe passed through a cycle of boom and in some ca-
ses, bust. Although there was a common exposure to the GFC, recovery was far from
universal across the zone. In part this was due to differing exposures to private and
public sector debt. In addition, specific casual influences differed as between individual
countries. Oil prices recovered quickly between 2009 and 2013, to the benefit of produ-
cers such as Norway, the Netherlands and the UK. A number of countries, including
Poland and the Czech Republic joined the EU in the course of its 2004 enlargement. So-
me countries were impacted more than others by the rise of manufactured imports from
China and Vietnam. Data availability precludes coverage of subsequent events such as
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the collapse of oil prices and more recently the refugee crisis.
The empirical analysis that follows is based on data drawn from Eurostat, EU Statistics
on Income and Living Conditions (2013). We use the monthly disposable income on
household level in local currencies, with overall an average of 6,875 observations per
year and country. The subset selected for detailed analysis covers 15 European countries
between 2004 and 2013.
3.1. Dynamics with the Gini index
Following the discussion of section 1, a preliminary check is whether the Lorenz curves
do intersect in our dataset. Table 1 shows the number of intersections for the Lorenz
curves in the case of Germany. In only five out of 28 combinations do the curves not
intersect. Since the assumptions about the relative variance required for intersecting
curves are not met, it would therefore not be legitimate to compare the Gini coefficients
between intersecting years. Furthermore when moving to a cross-sectional perspective,
the number of comparisons of Lorenz curves will increase exponentially and with it the
incommensurability of the Gini’s within time or across countries.
Tab. 1: Intersections of Lorenz curves for the disposable inco-
me in Germanyα
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
1 1 1 1 5 1 4 5 2005
5 3 3 2 2 2 3 2006
5 0* 2 2 0* 1 2007
2 0* 4 0* 2 2008
2 10 2 3 2009
1 2 5 2010
0* 3 2011
3 2012
α Shown are the number of intersections points when compa-
ring the Lorenz curves calculated from the income distribution
of Germany for the corresponding years.
* Combinations without intersection Lorenz curves.
3.2. Dynamics in the v-d plane
A dynamic phase plane analysis turns out to be an effective way of highlighting both
the similarities and differences. For space reasons the phase diagrams are reproduced
only for the more major economics, or else those that were subject to particular stress.
Among the latter, Greece could not be included because of very limited data availability.
Diagrams for all the remaining European countries can be obtained from the authors.
Formats in figure 1 plot the normalised v metrics against those for spread on the ho-
rizontal axis. No country has a negative v metric, hence the positive vertical half axis.
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The countries differ as to the observed range of the normalised asymmetry and spread
metrics v˜, d˜ , and this is reflected in the axis ranges of the respective diagrams. As a
visual aid, directional links are employed to make the time sequence more identifiable.
The respective time periods of data availability can be identified from the beginning and
end dates of these sequences.
3.3. Discussion
As a useful if somewhat imprecise generalisation, the respective v-d dynamics can be
categorised into three groups, provisionally labelled the ‘inequality risers’, the ‘inequa-
lity fallers’; and ‘mixed’ where the trend is less clear. Table 2 lists the countries in this
format. Further details about these groups and their constituents are provided in Table
3. There, the first column gives the average GDP per capita change over the available
data horizon for each country as the third dimension of welfare analysis (cf. expressi-
on 8), together with the overall ranking of the growth. There is no clear association on
this count between inequality risers and fallers. Also reported are the asymmetry and
dispersion parameters before, at, and after the GFC together with the corresponding
ranking within the 15 countries. Comparative rankings are not automatically responsive
to individual metric changes, though there is some effect with inequality increases.
What the data do show is that the impact of economic events has varied between the
European countries. Bad economic times in countries such as Italy, Spain, and France
have been affected more at the low end of the income scale; while in Portugal the burden
has been spread more uniformly. This is also true of Germany and the Netherlands, even
though the economic impact was more muted. Newer members of the European Union
have fared better in this respect. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, all admitted
in the 2004 Enlargement, share a common experience of falling income inequality and a
healthy average GDP growth rate.
Tab. 2: Secular inequality trends over the sample period from 2004 - 2013
Inequality risers Inequality fallers Mixed
v, d rise over time v, d fall over time
France Czech Republic Austria
Italy Hungary Belgium
Spain Ireland Germany
Sweden Norway Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
United Kingdom
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4. Concluding remarks
The asymmetry – spread phase plane diagrams of figure 1 reveal significant differences
over the data horizon. It is easy enough to rationalise the experience of some countries,
Norway being an obvious example with the strength of oil prices over the interval.
Likewise, joining the EU has on the face of it been good, with fallers such as the Czech
Republic or Hungary reflecting rising employment and wages as tariffs are dismantled
and trade opened up.
But other comparisons are more problematical, even those that one might expect to be
similar. Why is France a riser, which one might consider bad, but neighbouring Germany
is not, but corresponds to the mixed group? Likewise both Spain and Portugal suffered
from the GFC, but why is Spain a v-d riser while the Portugal is a faller? Macroeconomic
data, such as unemployment, or the public and private debt to GDP ratio, do not appear
to throw much light on such issues. Structural impediments to the adjustment of wages
or employment might have been of more importance in countries such as France, with
its public sector rigidities.
To summarise, the metrics and phase diagrams do not in themselves resolve issues of
this kind. But in throwing up differences in such a dramatic way, they do motivate the
search for answers on a more structural level. Over time there will arise fresh circum-
stantial challenges, whether these arise from global fallouts, localised trading blocs, or
political events on a national level. If nothing else, the message of the present paper is
that one way or another, these do have an observable welfare impact on the economic
shares of society.
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A. Figures and Tables
Fig. 2: Phase diagrams for the different countries for the complete time interval.
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Fig. 1: cont’d: Phase diagrams
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Fig. 0: cont’d: Phase diagrams
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Tab. 3: Results of the proposed new inequality measure with rankingα
Av. Change GDP / Rank d/µ Rank d/µ Rank
% p.cap 2005 2010 2013 2005 2010 2013 2005 2010 2013 2005 2010 2013
Risers
FR* 1.06 12 0.95 1.08 1.06 5 10 10 0.2 0.3 0.3 4 13 13
IT* -0.28 15 1.11 1.1 1.16 9 11 14 0.2 0.2 0.3 8 9 12
ES* 0.77 13 1.08 1.1 1.12 8 13 12 0.2 0.2 0.2 5 7 9
SE 1.94 4 0.81 0.84 0.87 1 3 4 0.1 0.1 0.1 1 1 2
Fallers
CZ 2.41 2 0.91 0.86 0.82 3 4 2 0.2 0.2 0.2 7 6 5
HU 1.28 10 0.95 0.83 0.92 6 1 5 0.2 0.1 0.2 6 2 6
IE 2.22 3 1.18 1.07 1.13 10 9 13 0.3 0.2 0.3 11 10 15
NO 1.65 5 1.47 0.86 0.79 15 5 1 0.7 0.2 0.1 15 3 1
PO 3.95 1 1.2 1.1 1.07 11 12 11 0.3 0.2 0.2 10 11 10
PT* -0.02 14 1.35 1.22 1.19 13 15 15 0.4 0.3 0.3 12 15 14
UK 1.45 6 1.29 1.15 1.03 12 14 8 0.4 0.3 0.2 13 14 8
Mixed
AT 1.43 8 0.93 1.06 0.99 4 7 7 0.2 0.2 0.2 3 8 3
BE 1.45 6 1.38 0.94 0.94 14 6 6 0.6 0.2 0.2 14 5 7
DE 1.31 9 1.04 1.07 1.04 7 8 9 0.3 0.3 0.2 9 12 11
NL 1.07 11 0.82 0.84 0.83 2 2 3 0.1 0.2 0.2 2 4 4
α The table shows the average GDP growth from 2005 to 2013, the scaled dispersion and skewness
measures before the GFC (taken as 2005*), just after the GFC (taken as 2010) and most recent available
(2013).
* 2005 data not available for France, Italy, Portugal. Provided data are from 2007.
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